UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Statement by Mr H.E. Mr Peter Tesch Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative Australian Mission to the United Nations

Third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 NPT Review Conference

New York 26 April 2004

Mr Chairman

The Australian delegation congratulates you most warmly on your appointment as Chairman of this Committee. It is especially pleasing that Indonesia, a near neighbour which shares our non-proliferation goals, has provided the Chair for this important meeting.

We meet at a time of continuing challenge for the NPT. Recent events are a sharp reminder that the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation has not passed. Exposure of the AQ Khan proliferation network laid bare a sophisticated nuclear blackmarket. Our fears that existing measures were insufficient to stop determined proliferators have been confirmed. The task we now face is to act to ensure the Treaty's effectiveness. In doing so, we will need to work cooperatively and in a clear sighted way, and be open to new ideas.

The value the international community attaches to the NPT is seen in its near universal membership We again call upon the three countries yet to join - India, Pakistan and Israel - to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states. In the meantime these states have a responsibility to support the nuclear non-proliferation norm, particularly by ensuring strict domestic controls on their nuclear materials, equipment, technology and knowledge.

Developments since the Preparatory Committee met last have highlighted a clear and urgent need to strengthen the Treaty’s compliance and verification mechanisms. We and many others are of the firm view that the Additional Protocol together with a comprehensive safeguards agreement is now the safeguards standard required of non-nuclear weapon states by Article III.1 of the NPT. We consider an Additional Protocol in force should be part of the fullscope safeguards nuclear supply condition by no later than the end of 2005.

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program remains a grave concern. NPT parties must be united in calling for North Korea to completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons program. We urge North Korea not to let slip the historic chance offered by the six-party talks process for a peaceful and lasting solution. Australia commends to North Korea the example of Libya which after decades of isolation stands to receive economic, diplomatic and other benefits following its decision to abandon WMD. We urge North Korea to reverse its announced NPT withdrawal and comply fully with IAEA safeguards.

North Korea’s actions illustrate the risk of NPT states acquiring sensitive nuclear technology then announcing NPT withdrawal. NPT parties may wish also to consider adoption at the 2005 Review Conference of some common understandings to ensure NPT withdrawal is not seen as a viable option for escaping from non-proliferation obligations.

The extent of the Khan proliferation network illustrated starkly the critical importance of effective national controls over production and export of sensitive technology, materials and know how, and of international coordination in the application of national laws. We urge all NPT parties to ensure their controls on relevant items and technology are of a standard at least equivalent to the major nuclear export control regimes, and are strictly enforced.

Australia welcomes the proposed UN Security Council non-proliferation resolution which, among other steps, will require states to enact effective domestic controls, including export controls, to prevent WMD proliferation. We hope this resolution will be adopted soon. We would like to see the UN Security Council more active in defending the nuclear non-proliferation norm and responding firmly when states breach their safeguards obligations.

The peaceful nuclear cooperation provisions of Article IV are an essential part of the balance of rights and obligations states which assume under the Treaty. NPT parties which violate their safeguards obligations should not expect to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear cooperation. NPT parties should refrain from any nuclear cooperation with any state called on by the IAEA Board of Governors to rectify violations of its safeguards obligations until the Board determines the state is back in full compliance.

The risk of NPT parties misusing the Treaty’s peaceful nuclear energy provisions in order to acquire the technical basis for a rapid breakout to nuclear weapons is a serious matter for the international community. Australia is ready to work in appropriate forums on ways to address this danger, including by considering the ideas raised by IAEA Director General ElBaradei and US President Bush. Australia considers a moratorium on new enrichment and reprocessing plants should be applied while an appropriate framework is developed to ensure such projects do not present a risk to non-proliferation objectives.

Iran is still far from resolving international concerns about its nuclear program. IAEA reports have, since the last Preparatory Committee, brought to light repeated and serious failures by Iran to comply with its safeguards obligations. Iran has taken steps toward greater transparency and cooperation with the IAEA. But more remains to be done. Iran must cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve outstanding questions about its nuclear activities, ratify without delay its Additional Protocol, and in order to build international confidence maintain a suspension on all enrichment and reprocessing activities.

Mr Chairman

We should be quite clear that, while only a few NPT parties are cause for compliance concerns, this situation directly threatens the NPT’s non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful use objectives. It is simply not conceivable that a world free of nuclear weapons will be achieved in the absence of complete and permanent assurances of nuclear non-proliferation. Non-proliferation assurances are also fundamental to the climate of long term assurance and stability necessary for peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Article VI commitments are a central obligation of the Treaty. Australia remains firmly committed to the goal of practical progress on nuclear disarmament expressed in the 13 disarmament steps from the 2000 NPT Review Conference. We acknowledge the progress made on nuclear disarmament, but together with other non-nuclear weapon states expect continued movement by the nuclear weapon states in giving effect to their disarmament obligations. Australia regards the Treaty of Moscow as a significant step towards nuclear disarmament. We look forward to the Moscow Treaty’s full implementation which, within a decade, will see US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads reduced by two thirds. It is important that the nuclear weapon states be as transparent as possible regarding their nuclear weapons policies and the actions taken to fulfil NPT nuclear disarmament obligations.

With 171 signatories and 112 ratifications the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has established a powerful international norm against nuclear testing. Australia urges those yet to sign or ratify the CTBT to do so without delay. Until the CTBT enters into force, existing moratoriums on nuclear testing must be maintained and strong support for development of the CTBT’s International Monitoring System sustained.

Australia remains of the view a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would contribute to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives. We look to this PrepCom to reiterate support for early negotiation of the FMCT. We call upon China to join the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons already announced by the other nuclear weapon states, and for the nuclear capable states outside the NPT also to join this moratorium.

Mr Chairman

The past year has thrown up significant proliferation challenges but has also seen encouraging progress on addressing these challenges. It is clear that firm, unified international action across a number of fronts can be effective in responding to proliferation challenges and maintaining the Treaty’s integrity. NPT parties are spelling out more clearly the benefits for those who comply with the highest non-proliferation standards and offer genuine transparency. The negative consequences for those who violate their non-proliferation obligations are better understood. The UK and US effort in working with Libya on its decision to renounce WMD stands as a case study of how diplomatic initiatives can reinforce the non-proliferation regime. The Proliferation Security Initiative developed to impede illicit WMD and missile related trafficking has evolved rapidly as a valuable reinforcement for the NPT and other WMD treaties. Over 60 countries have now indicated their support for the PSI.

With these comments, Mr Chairman, the Australian delegation stands ready to work with you and others joined by the interest we all share in maintaining this vital instrument.