Statement by Mr John Tilemann, International Security Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, as delivered on 19 July 2010.
(as delivered)
Thank you Mr Facilitator
We are pleased to contribute to the discussion on the important topic of parameters and criteria to be considered by States when assessing authorizations for conventional arms transfers. These parameters will constitute part of the common international standards which we have been mandated to negotiate.
In Australia’s view, the parameters in the Treaty should provide the framework to govern how states make decisions regarding arms transfers. The parameters will relate to the transfer itself or to the risks associated with the use of the arms to be transferred. To ensure transparency and ease of implementation, the parameters should be clear, simple and consistent.
We need to establish, through these negotiations, the actual parameters to be used and the consequences of a conclusion that the parameters have been met.
Mr Facilitator
We first turn to the consequences to be applied if it is concluded that a certain parameter has, or a number of parameters have, been met. In considering the consequences, relevant factors include the parameter’s basis in international law and its connection to the achievement of the objectives of an ATT. There will be a range of means to capture different consequences. These could be broken down into roughly three categories:
1) certain circumstances, that if individually met, would lead a State Party to prohibit a transfer of arms;
2) circumstances, either taken individually or collectively, that may lead a State Party to prohibit a transfer; and
3) other factors that must be considered by a State in assessing a transfer.
Mr Facilitator
I now turn to the actual elaboration of parameters. Thankfully our task can benefit from existing principles of responsible transfers. These can be readily found in UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, the Guidelines on international arms transfer adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1996, the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons, the UN Firearms Protocol and other international and regional instruments.
Australia considers that an application to transfer arms should be denied if any of the following criteria are satisfied:
- where the goods breach global or regional embargoes, or would be contrary to the UN Charter or a UN Security Council resolution;
- the goods might be used by criminal groups, including terrorists;
- the goods could be diverted to unauthorised users
- the goods could be used in the commission of a serious violation of international humanitarian law, or genocide or crimes against humanity.
The following criteria could form part of a more general risk assessment:
- the UN Security Council has imposed sanctions restricting the sale, supply or transfer of defence or dual-use goods to the recipient country;
- the goods might be used in a recipient country in a manner contrary to a State’s international obligations or commitments;
- the goods might be used in the commission of violations of international humanitarian law;
- the goods might be used to commit or facilitate serious human rights abuses;
- the goods might contribute to instability in the region or aggravate a threat to international and regional peace and security;
- the goods might be used in internal or international armed conflict or could exacerbate conflict in the recipient country; and
- the goods might be transferred to or through zones of conflict or States/regions where there are high levels of armed violence.
Can I also add, in response to some concerns raised by other delegations, that we think that these criteria can be included in an ATT and applied in a manner that is not overly subject to political abuse. There is no need to define all these terms – they are subject to national consideration of an exporting country. Criteria such as those assessing the possibility of serious breaches of international human rights and humanitiarian law have long existed and are already considered by most exporting States in their national practice.
Australia also supports obligations being placed on States to transfer certain items only to Governments or their authorized agents, for instance for MANPADS, and not to re-export conventional arms without the consent of the original exporting State.
We will need to consider, in elaborating the parameters, what level of risk should be required. We are interested in other delegations’ views on this point.
In any listing of criteria for national decision-making processes, we prefer criteria to be clearly identifiable or demonstrable. Where possible, agreed legal standards should be set, and if this is not possible, practical and relevant indicators should be agreed. There could be difficulty for States in applying standards which are not easily defined or definable.
Ultimately, it is for each State Party to implement and apply the parameters specified in the ATT. Importantly, we repeat, that no State should be precluded from imposing more stringent requirements than those that an ATT may contain.
Mr Facilitator
The ATT may benefit from developing methodologies for how a State is to undertake an assessment – how it should fulfill the obligations at the heart of the Treaty. Again, there could be a number of ways of achieving this, and we are flexible as to whether methodologies be spelt out in detail or left broad.
For instance, it might be helpful to explicitly provide in the Treaty that States should take into account relevant information, such as that provided by a State’s own agencies and authorities, competent bodies of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations and other States and non-governmental bodies. Other particularly relevant factors to take into account are the nature of the transfer itself, the nature of the end-user, the proposed and likely use of the arms, and patterns of country behavior.
We may also wish the ATT to allow specifically for the development of implementing guidelines on matters like authorization practices. Such guidelines could be later drawn up and adopted by States Parties after adoption of the ATT. It would be important that such guidelines would not be binding or necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty.
We look forward to further debate on the topic of parameters and working with others to elaborate criteria for the ATT.
Thank you.