Statement by H.E. Gary Quinlan, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty, as delivered on 12 July 2010.
(as delivered)
Thank you Mr Chair. And let me congratulate you on your continuing role which we value very highly.
I should say at the outset that, in Australia’s view, the irresponsible and illicit transfer of conventional arms and their components is of such grave and pressing concern that it can only be adquately addressesd through the establishment of a legally binding multilateral treaty. We will continue to be a robust supporter of that objective.
We must also recognise that many of the issues before us are cross-cuttting and it will be critical that we take this into account when addressing the purpose, scope and obligations of a Treaty.
Taking up your invitation to comment on the possible elements of such a Treaty, we would make the following intial comments. We will develop these and make further comments as we proceed in more detail over the next few days.
First, Australia supports the development of a generic, non-exhaustive list of categories that may fall within the scope of an ATT which would be indicative only. Care would need to be taken to ensure emerging technologies can be covered as far as possible without an ATT becoming outdated quickly or requiring constant amendment.
In relation to the obligations that would fall within the scope of an ATT, Australia also remains open to considering guiding principles rather than a specific list. Care would need to be taken to avoid the creation of loopholes and ambiguities and to ensure clarity is retained and langauge can be easily updated.
Australia believes that an ATT should incorporate and codify existing best practice in responsible transfers and acknowledges there may be a need for the the Preparatory Committee to discuss what constitutes such best practice. In this regard, we recognise the value of existing multilateral and regional instruments. The obligations of an ATT could be based on existing principles of responsible arms transfers.
Regardless of the model, if an ATT were to list factors for States to consider in national decision-making processes, these should be clearly identifiable or demonstrable. Australia foresees difficulty for States in applying standards which are not easily defined or definable. Also, we believe that no State should obviously be precluded from imposing more stringent requirements than those than an ATT may contain.
Mr Chair
In order to be effective, an ATT also requires a level of public transparency which would contribute to general peace and security as a confidence-building measure. Confidential information-sharing would also be necessary at the operational level. We recognise that these elements must be carefully distinguished: the processes and procedures currently used by various international export control regimes could help inform the work of the ATT Preparatory Committee.
We consider that an ATT should not be prescriptive in relation to national implementation, which should remain the sole responsibility of each State. For example, States should hve the primary responsibility for controlling imports, and exporting States should have the responsibility to satisfy themselves that the import regulations of the receiving State have been met.
We think that an ATT could include agreed minimum levels of information which States must include on end-use and end-user certification in order to facilitate enforcement (as agreed by the ATT Group of Governmental Experts).
Mr Chair
We recognise we will need to consider exceptions to a Treaty. In this regard, we will need to consider military exceptions considering the international nature of military operations, exercises and training.
Finally, Australia considers international assistance should be a key element of an ATT, including the need for capacity0building to implement the Treaty. We note cooperation and assistance should be voluntary.
Thank you Mr Chair.